PRINCIPLES OF TASTE,

OR THE

ELEMENTS OF BEAUTY.

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OR

THE ELEMENTS OF BEAUTY.

ALSO

REFLECTIONS

ON THE HARMONY

OF

SENSIBILITY AND REASON.

THE SECOND EDITION, MUCH IMPROVED.

TO WHICH IS ANNEXED

A SHORT ANALYSIS

OF THE

HUMAN MIND.

BY J. DONALDSON.

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ADVERTISEMENT.

A SMALL edition of the firſt and ſecond of the following pieces was printed in the year 1780. Another, much more full and perſpicuous, is now preſented to the public; to which is ſubjoined, as mentioned in the title, a Short Analyſis of the Human Mind. The whole is intended to aſcertain juſt principles of polite ſcience, and of ſocial goodneſs; to trace the origin, progreſs, and perfection of ideas, and thus to raiſe on a ſolid foundation of truth, a pure and permanent ſyſtem of virtue and happineſs. The ſeveral ſubjects are of a kindred nature, and a knowledge of the one tends, reciprocally, to a right underſtanding of the other.

CONTENTS.

SECT. I. Of the General Subject.

Sect. II. Of Light.

Sect. III. Of Sound.

Sect. IV. Of Motion.

Sect. V. Of Aſſociation.

Sect. VI. Of Contraſt.

Sect. VII. Of Perſonification.

Sect. VIII. Of Character and Expreſſion.

Sect. IX. Of Gracefulneſs.

INTRODUCTION.

TO inveſtigate the cauſes of beauty, and to explain the connexion between outward elegance and virtue, is a taſk which has often been attempted, yet it does not appear that this intereſting ſubject has hitherto been reduced to any clear philoſophical and ſatisfactory ſyſtem, though ſuch cauſes and connexion are evidently perceived to ſubſiſt.

The common error of moſt modern writers on beauty has been, that they have ſuppoſed all things, in order to appear completely beautiful, ſubject to one fixed principle relative only to

ſenſe; ſuch as ſhape or proportion. Books have been written in ſupport of uniformity and variety, terms comprehending the nature of all things, rather than containing a deſcription of what alone is beautiful; others to perſuade us in favour of ſoftneſs and ſmoothneſs, and of a ſerpentine form of beauty, qualities too particular to comprehend ſo extenſive a ſubject. Propriety has alſo been aſſigned as the cauſe of beauty: but, ſince there are many things which ſtrike us as beautiful before we diſcern their uſefulneſs, propriety can at beſt be admitted a concomitant, not an efficient cauſe, of beauty. Concerning matters of taſte, we appeal to the feelings of the heart, rather than to the abilities of the head. Taſte prevents judgment, and is more beholden to ſentiment than experience. There is, however, a perfect agreement between right reaſon and

true taſte: they are reciprocal teſts of each other's validity; ſince we are not ſatisfied that ſuch things pleaſe, but are apt to inquire into the cauſes and effects of this pleaſure before we allow its authenticity. This has led many to believe, that beauty depends on propriety or fitneſs, though it is evident, a toad is as fit for the purpoſes of its nature as a turtle-dove; and we may remark of artificial ornaments, that they are for the moſt part of little or no utility. Beauty, indeed, is not the ſame with goodneſs; but rather what is pleaſing to ſenſe, converted into an expreſſion of goodneſs.

To define beauty by ſoftneſs and ſmoothneſs, and the doctrine of mere lines, is reducing it to the notion of ſimple ſenſation; but ſurely one may ſee and hear, without the perceptions

of beauty and harmony peculiar to delicacy of ſentiment? For whatever beauty we may perceive in the ſubordinate objects of ſenſe, it is to an expreſſion of the finer paſſions that we owe the higheſt pleaſures of beauty. And as it is the ſocial principle which raiſes our enjoyments ſo far above the pleaſures of other beings, ſo it is the viſible ſigns appropriated by nature to this principle, which render the human body ſuperiorly beautiful.

PRINCIPLES OF TASTE,

OR THE

ELEMENTS OF BEAUTY.

SECTION I.

OF THE GENERAL SUBJECT.

OBJECTS, ſo far as they are beautiful, are either ſuch as moſt clearly excite gentle *perception*, or *life*, in the ſenſes; or ſuch as not only produce this effect, but likewiſe imply an *expreſſion of life*, or *pleaſing ſenſibility*.

As the natural love of life, or the conſciouſneſs of exiſtence, is the foundation of all animal pleaſure; ſo the firſt and

ſimpleſt of our ſenſations, particularly relative to beauty, and of which our primary ideas are chiefly compounded, are light, ſound, and motion. A moderate perception of theſe, is life as beſt excited in their reſpective ſenſes; an exceſſive operation, while it confounds the living power, is painful, as conducive to its deſtruction. Images of darkneſs, ſilence, and univerſal reſt, likewiſe are attended with horror, on account of their ſimilarity to the privation of ſight and hearing; or to the extinction of thoſe perceptions which principally conſtitute the ſimple idea of *animation*.

Some objects act directly on the ſenſes; ſome by indication raiſe images of other objects: the ear is pleaſed with

ſounds which indicate objects pleaſing to the eye; the eye with images that promiſe pleaſure to the touch; and theſe again are yet more delightful as they communicate ſentiments of pleaſure. The colours, voices, and motions of animals indicate *life* and the various modifications of it, thus becoming the means of a ſocial ſenſe, and hence originate all our moral perceptions. When the qualities moſt pleaſing to the ſenſes, are combined into a whole, expreſſive of the fineſt ſocial affection, they compoſe an object of perfect beauty.

We ſhall proceed, then, to illuſtrate this ſubject, under the various articles, of *light*, *ſound*, and *motion*.

SECTION II.

OF LIGHT.

PERCEPTION of light, is *life* as excited in the eye. The greateſt beauty of light, is that certain degree and modification of it which is neither too weak or too violent, but which implies the gentleſt yet cleareſt perception. A ſhade approaching to black or privation of colour, implies negation of ſenſe, and therefore, alone, is diſagreeable. Of all modes of colour, a full red operates moſt ſtrongly on the eye; of all, a deep or livid grey is moſt inactive.

SOME of our perceptions, derived from light or colour, are leſs direct in their manner of operation. With a yel-

lowiſh light, we are apt to aſſociate a certain degree of warmth, theſe being by experience commonly aſſociated: with a ruddy coloured light, for the ſame reaſon we connect a notion of yet a greater degree of heat. Thus, by habit, certain qualities inferred, come to act much in the ſame way as immediate objects of ſenſation.

Our ideas of light and heat, are originally and cloſely connected. That etherial fire which is the life, is the light of the world. The mellow amber-coloured light, ſuch as is ſometimes ſeen in a ſerene evening ſky, while it is moſt delicious to ſight, is, of all colours, moſt expreſſive of the wholeſome degree of warmth congenial to life, and to the de-

licious of paſſion. It is the medium between red, which implies the violence of heat, and blue, which expreſſes coldneſs;—that certain degree of light and indicated heat, which excites the moſt agreeable ſenſation.

So far as effects of light or darkneſs are adapted by nature to the expreſſion of ſentiment, we may obſerve, that in the languid and ſullen emotions of the mind, the features accumulate a greater degree of ſhade; the countenance aſſumes a dark and cloudy appearance. Gloomy, livid, and black, are complexions ſuitable to horror, deſpair, and death.

THE bluiſh pale of the human countenance, proper to expreſſions of fear,

conveys an idea of coldneſs;—it is that of ſnow or ice, when viewed in the ſhade.

In ſilence roaming round the world of woe,
Guided along by that malignant light,
That leſs than morning ſeem'd, and more than night,
Pale, gleaming from the frozen lake below.

DANTE'S INFERNO, BY BOYD.

FAINT, pale, and livid tints, are fitted to expreſs fearfulneſs, and a diminution of the powers of life; ſtrong and fiery ones, to ſignify paſſions of a contrary nature. Gentle tones of colour, aſſociate with, and diſpoſe to, the gentle and delicate of internal feeling; harſh and ſharp ones, with rude and diſagreeable emotions.

An appearance of violent heat, is expreſſive of the violence of paſſion; anger is denoted by a deep and fiery red.

But Jove, averſe, the ſigns of wrath diſplay'd,
And ſhot red lightnings through the gloomy ſhade.
Popes Hom. Il. B. vii. v. 570.

This analogy might be traced in the operations of the other ſenſes; odours may be arranged under the heavy or deleterious, the ſtrong and fetid, and the moderately volatile and lively. Things that are inſipid to taſte, that dull the palate, or ſuch as act on it with violence, are ever ungrateful. That poſitive degree of ſoftneſs and ſmoothneſs, that gentle reſiſtence, by means of which we beſt perceive, is moſt agreeable to feeling. In ſhort, whatever is beſt calculated to excite the cleareſt perceptions of

ſenſe, is moſt agreeable; whatever acts with negative effect, or too ſtrongly, is unpleaſing or painful; and it is by means of ſuch images that the very paſſions which they ſerved originally to excite, are again moſt effectually to be communicated. But as we before obſerved, ſince ideas of beauty chiefly refer to perceptions of ſight and hearing, we ſhall confine our reflections particularly to the operations of thoſe ſenſes.

It is remarkable, there is in animated nature, a cloſe analogy between the principal ſigns of life, and the primary objects of ſenſe; it is light alone by which the eye enjoys its pleaſures of perception; it is light again reflected from the eye, to which it owes its ſuperior viva-

city and expreſſion. A gentle, yet clear, variation of colour or motion, is pleaſing to ſight, as that of ſound is to hearing; and it is by ſuch variations that we communicate our ſentiments of pleaſure.

SECTION III.

OF SOUND.

We have already obſerved, that ſound is one of the firſt or ſimple ſenſations; and that an idea of perfect ſilence is accompanied with horror, eſpecially when conjoined with darkneſs and univerſal reſt, as theſe are analogous to the negation of ſenſe; we ſhall therefore paſs to the conſideration of ſymphony, or the variations of ſound as they are exemplified in muſical expreſſion.

Of ſounds, the mellow, ſoft, and gentle, are moſt pleaſing to ſenſe, and beſt adapted to expreſs the gentle of ſentiment. Sweetly modulated whiſpers, are the language of the delicious

paſſion. Deep tones aſſociate with deepneſs of ſhade, and with ſlowneſs of motion. The loud, the ſharp, and the ſhrill, rank with other painful modes of perception.

THERE is a tone of voice, as well as a tint of colour, that is ſuited to terror and deſpair; reſembling, as it were, the pale and livid complexion. Thus Caſſandra is deſcribed by Æſchylus to pour the plaintive cry!

——YET with a voice
That terrifies, tho' ſweet, aloud thou ſpeak'ſt
Thy ſorrows. Whence haſt thou deriv'd theſe omens,
Thus deeply mark'd with characters of death?

POTTER'S ÆSCHYLUS.

As there is a light which may be ſaid to *counterfeit a gloom;——a darkneſs viſible;*

ſo there is a voice analogous; a ſilence poſitive; a ſhriek,—faint, ſhrill, expreſſive of deſpondence.

THE moſt refined melody is that which accords with gracefulneſs of ſentiment; it is chiefly employed in ſoothing the turbulent, and exciting the gentler emotions. The ruder paſſions are rouſed by ſomething that deſerves the name of noiſe or diſcord, rather than of muſic. As the violent emotions increaſe, ſenſibility is diminiſhed; as the gentler ones ſucceed, ſentiment is improved.

IN common diſcourſe, which treats of indifferent ſubjects, and conſiſts moſtly of narrative, the voice naturally tends to a ſettled monotony, or at beſt riſes to a

ſort of recitative; as converſation becomes more animated, the variations of voice are proportionally increaſed. Artificial muſic is an imitation of theſe natural variations, as they are more or leſs expreſſive of paſſion, or of all thoſe tender depreſſions and rapturous elevations of the ſoul, when ſhe pours herſelf forth in generous ecſtaſy: thoſe notes and combinations which pleaſe the ear, being adapted to the pleaſing of paſſion; the ſad and diſcordant moods, as in the paſſions themſelves, to ſet off the more melodious and cheerful: for our joys are continually mingled with abatement or ſorrow, and are beſt perceived by a certain degree of contraſt; gravity of ſound being an approach to ſilence, as ſhade to darkneſs,

and as flowneſs of motion is a drawing nearer to reſt. We cannot judge of any thing but by relation, and it is in the changes of things that we perceive them.

SECTION IV.

OF MOTION.

GENTLE yet lively motions; bodies ſmoothly gliding, undulating, or winding, excite the moſt diſtinct, and therefore pleaſing ſenſitive perceptions. Circular and changing ſhapes are alſo ſemblative of motion, as motion is of life. The poets, to diſtinguiſh clear running water from that which is at reſt, emphatically attribute life to the former:

And bid the handmaids for the feaſt prepare,
The ſeats to range, the fragrant wood to bring,
And limpid water from the *living* ſpring.

POPE'S HOM. ODYSS.

AN ellipſis may not improperly be defined, a line, the direction of which is

continually changing; though the figure be really permanent, and it is evidently the eye which changes. Milton, to expreſs the winding ſhape of the honey-ſuckle, calls it the *flaunting honey-ſuckle.*

With ivy canopied, and interwove
With flaunting honey-ſuckle. COMUS.

THUS, beauty of figure becomes a kind of ſubſtitute for elegance of motion.

EVERY caſt of attitude, in the human figure, indicates motion; and the previous motion is ſuggeſted to imagination from the preſent poſture of the perſon: hence we ſay, meaning of the attitude, ſuch a figure has an elegant *turn.*

WITH the moſt delicate ſentiments certain kindred forms, ſounds, and motions, naturally aſſociate, and are beſt calculated to expreſs, ſuch tenderneſs of ſentiment. As it is, in ſome ſenſe, alike whether the eye or the object moves, and it is plain that quick turnings in animals indicate a more ſudden exertion of the living power than ſlow ones; it will likewiſe follow, that wherever the eye overtakes lines running abruptly into contrary directions, ſuch lines will convey an idea of the ſudden changes of paſſion; though it is not they that move, but the ſight which moves along them; ſince every appearance we have experienced to hold an alliance with life, transferring the emotion to the

cauſe, we are apt to conceive is inſpired with paſſion: thus we ſay, light is cheerful, motion is ſprightly, or ſounds are pathetic.

BODIES apparently maſſy and opake, are underſtood to be heavy, to affect reſt, and conſequently ſilence. The *too much* is as incomprehenſible as the *too little*, and a certain degree of greatneſs ſtrikes us much in the ſame manner as vacuity: thus the ideas of vaſt magnitude, obſcurity, gravity, and ſtillneſs, will ever naturally incline to aſſociate, and to diſpoſe the mind to ſadneſs.

LEVITY and elevation are akin to life and liberty; the determination of bodies upward, is accompanied with a ſenti-

ment of freedom and ſprightlineſs. The riſing foliage of the Corinthian capital makes the column ſeem to bear its ſuperſtructure, not only with eaſe, but cheerfulneſs. Symptoms of elevated paſſion are, the head thrown up, the arms raiſed above the head, like thoſe Bacchanalian figures we ſee ſo often repreſented in the antique. Humility and abatement of ſpirit are expreſſed by motions of an oppoſite and liſtleſs kind, or rather by languor and ſuſpenſion of action. The places of life and happineſs are imagined to be upwards; men go down to the grave; miſery dwells below.

THE more violent paſſions are expreſſed by rudeneſs and extravagance of

motion, abrupt changes of form and colour. Sudden turnings and contortions are effects of pain, or belong to the extravagance of paſſion. An action energetic, yet gentle, is appropriated to emotions of the greateſt pleaſure.—Complete beauty, then, is an expreſſion of the moſt delightful feelings, conveyed by means of that which is to ſenſe moſt delicately pleaſing.

Music has alſo its counterpart in action. Dancing, or rather the quality of a graceful movement, is the muſic of motion; muſic and dancing expreſs the ſame thing, only in different ways; the art of dancing teaches to regulate the various movements and geſtures of the body to the humour of the muſic; both

anſwering to the ſentiment by which they are mutually inſpired.

AND in this way even inanimate matter, either by being put in motion, or ſo ordered as to invite the eye to move, is made to engage the mind, and to affect the paſſions, agreeable to the ſigns of ſuch paſſions in ourſelves: whence our ideas of form originate, and whither alſo they return by reflection.

SECTION V.

OF ASSOCIATION.

THOUGH we have no perceptions but what originate from ſenſation, yet ſtill it is life which pleaſes, whether enjoyed by the ſtrong and clear images of ſenſe, or whether impreſſions of theſe, mingling into ſentimental harmony, are attended with a more refined pleaſure; our ideas, by aſſociation and contraſt, improving in ſtrength, mutually aſſiſting each other, and increaſing affection, till at length we attain the higheſt excellence of ſocial perception.

WHAT is generally underſtood by harmony, relates properly to hearing;

but there is in nature, or rather in the human mind, a ſyſtem of univerſal ſymphony carried on by means of aſſociation and contraſt; ſince there is an attractive as well as a repelling power in every thing that concerns our ſentiments and ſenſations.

THE theory of natural aſſociation may be divided into the agreement of objects or qualities reſpecting any ſingle ſenſe; among images relating to various ſenſes; of thoſe of ſenſe with expreſſive living characters; and among various characters animated or expreſſive. Thus, as an inſtance of the firſt kind, gentleneſs of form, of colour, and of motion, qualities all relative to ſight, incline to aſſociate.

THINGS that accord with reſpect to different ſenſes, are ſuch as excite an equal degree of perception, or animation; every thing that is delicate to touch, accompanied with that particular ſhape, colouring, motion, and modulation of ſound, which agree to form an aſſemblage that is gentle and engaging. The ſweet ſoft tones of the Æolian harp admirably agree with the ſtill ſoftneſs of moon-light. How ſuitable to the riſing of the ſun, is the ſong of the lark? How well do Philomel's ſad notes accompany its ſetting? The gentle variations of colour, figure, ſmell, and touch, which are united by nature in flowers; is the reaſon they are ſo delicately pleaſing. When more of the ſenſes than one are employed at the

ſame time, they naturally act in uniſon, and their different powers are to be conſidered as tending to excite unity of ſentiment; to ſet them in oppoſition, therefore, would be to deſtroy the uniformity and energy of their effect.

As to inferior objects, and living characters aſſociated;—with a human character of gentle nature and expreſſion, the mind inclines to aſſociate every thing that is gentle.

THINGS of different kinds aſſociate by ſome particular and ſtriking ſimilitude; things of like general diſpoſition, by ſome peculiar difference or contraſt. Human characters being included in

this laſt kind, aſſociate by the diverſity of their expreſſion.—The dark complexion is a foil to the fair; the ſublime and ſtrongly marked characters, ſet off the more tenderly graceful.

BIRDS, beaſts, fiſhes, trees, and plants, are to be conſidered, each ſpecies, as a diſtinct order of leſs perfect characters; and there is an agreement between a proper aſſemblage of theſe and human characters, or their particular virtues or paſſions perſonified: thus, among the ancients, the eagle was ſacred to Jupiter; the peacock to Juno; ſwans and pidgeons to Venus. The ſturdy oak and poplar were aſſigned to Hercules; the gentle myrtle to Venus. Every thing of the animated kind ſeeming to attract

that which is expreſſive, in any degree, of a like diſpoſition; and to form a whole, that, by means of its variety or internal contraſts, yeilds the cleareſt and moſt perfect object of perception.

WHAT pleaſes any one ſenſe, comes as it were recommended to the reſt. What is beautiful, we are diſpoſed to think is good; what is good, beautiful. But here we muſt carefully diſtinguiſh between the good, and the beautiful; between notions of wholeſomeneſs or utility, and that which produces an immediate perception of pleaſure. Reſpecting the latter, we appeal directly to the innate and original powers of ſenſe; for the former, to experience, which teaches us, that what is moſt beautiful

is not ever the beſt, nor that which is leſs beholden to favour always the moſt uſeleſs or evil. The perpendicular wall of a houſe is good, becauſe uprightneſs implies ſtability, but it is not therefore beautiful; on the contrary, the ornamental part of architecture ſtrikes us not as being any otherwiſe uſeful than that it immediately pleaſes. The withered leaves of plants frequently exhibit a colouring more agreeable to the eye, than when they are freſh and in bloom. The ſmoke iſſuing from the chimney of a country cottage is not ſo pleaſing in itſelf, but its ſerene blue, when the ſun ſhines on it in a particular direction, its thinneſs, and gentle winding motion upwards, implying levity and ſoftneſs, when joined with ideas of

rural happineſs, convey a delicate ſenſation of pleaſure: and this may be conſidered as an inferior ſpecies of expreſſion, ſince by thoſe gentle images are conveyed feelings of ſocial pleaſure that otherwiſe might not be perceived. Other objects, though really good or uſeful, have nothing in them very pleaſing to ſenſe, neither do they bear any external marks of ſenſibility, and therefore cannot be ſaid to partake of beauty. Even with regard to the human character, we do not find that virtue ever accompanies the faireſt form.—Malevolent deſign frequently plays *the ſimilar* of virtue, rendering even beauty hideous by deceit; while goodneſs, too, is ſometimes compelled to aſſume the hoſtile guiſe, yet when viewed by the mind

through the foreign veil, is beheld in her native ſweetneſs, as ever pointing to ſome kindly purpoſe.

THINGS that are aſſociated by habit with pleaſing objects, though in themſelves not agreeable, become by ſuch habitual aſſociation pleaſing, provided the balance be on the agreeable ſide; but the lineal and ſpeckled beauty of the ſerpent will not eaſily command our attention, ſo long as the horror continues with which that animal ſtrikes us.

ASSOCIATION is of two kinds, natural, and acquired: for example, it is natural to aſſociate pleaſing ſounds with other objects of pleaſure, but by habit

the ear may be ſo far reconciled to harſh notes as to aſſociate them with impreſſions that are originally pleaſing; and hence we may account for the partiality of any ſavage nation to its peculiar rude ſtile of muſic.—When diſagreeable ſymbols are employed to ſignify good qualities, or beautiful ones to repreſent ſentiments of diſpleaſure, they are no longer natural, but diſcordant and arbitrary. To deny that a fair complexion is naturally more agreeable to the eye than a black one, is to deny that light is more pleaſing than darkneſs; yet obſcurity itſelf may become agreeable, by being habitually connected with other qualities, that, on the whole, preponderate, and are naturally delightful.

As, when one ſenſe, however, is much employed, the reſt require a due repoſe, ſo, amid all our admiration of beauty, we muſt remark there is a chaſtity of outward form, a modeſty of perſon, that better ſuits with inward worth. The ſkin and colour may be too fair and gaudy, the eyes too brilliant, the ſtature too aſſuming, the body on the whole too ſplendid eaſily to admit of, or accord with temperance of mind, or gentleneſs of meaning. In a word, it is better that perſonal beauty be ſubordinate, than that it ſhould either rival or be ſuperior to goodneſs.

In a pictureſque ſcene of the moſt intereſting nature, where the whole attention is ſuppoſed to be required for

the principal group or figure, it were impertinent to divert imagination with ſtriking acceſſories: in this caſe there ſhould be a total repoſe, or abſence of all inferior objects and ſcenery, except ſuch as perfectly aſſiſt the general expreſſion.

It is for this cauſe that the fineſt melody, the muſic which moſt engages the heart, will not admit of more accompaniment than a ſingle baſs, and that, too, of a very ſubordinate and ſimple nature. Sometimes indeed even this is with advantage omitted. In thoſe tender paſſages where rapture riſes to its utmoſt height, where the mind is too much engaged with the ſentiment expreſſed, to be much concerned about

the means of expreſſion, the leaſt accompaniment would interrupt that deliquium of pleaſure which is beſt expreſſed by tones and inflexions ſo gentle that they are almoſt imperceptible to hearing!

WITH a lively ſentiment, lively images of ſenſe will naturally aſſociate; with the agreeable of the latter, what is agreeable of the former; pleaſing aſſociations in the mind being no other than images and ſentiments ſo diſpoſed as to heighten internal perception, and pleaſure.

FAR-OFF ſounds, or diſtant proſpects, aſſociate with, and bring to remembrance, paſt circumſtances and actions;

becauſe theſe, too, are become more ſubtile in imagination, and rendered, as it were, remote by time.

THE departure of day, of the ſummer ſeaſon, and of the perſon we love, are circumſtances which, when united, contribute to form a ſentiment of deepeſt melancholy. Tempeſt and darkneſs are ſuitable to acts of horror:

Great Jove, to ſwell the horror of the fight,
O'er the fierce armies pours pernicious night.

POPE'S HOM. IL. B. xvi. v. 695.

THE elemental ſtorm in Shakeſpear's Lear, well aſſimilates the ſtorm in the mind of the diſtreſſed king. Why are lovers fond of moon-light, but becauſe, like ſoft muſic, it is gentle, as the paſſion

they indulge, and ſuits the tender tranſport of their ſouls?—There is a fine aſſemblage of languid motion, ſadneſs, and obſcurity, in the following deſcription of old Laertes in his rural retirement.

Where ſole of all his train, a matron ſage
Supports with homely ſteps, his drooping age;
With feeble ſteps, from marſhalling his vines,
Returning ſad, when toilſome day declines,

POPE'S HOM. ODYSS. B. i.

HERE, the decline of life, and days decline, with the ſadneſs, and langour which they produce, are finely aſſociated.—

IDEAL extinctions of motion, light, and life, are with like elegance combined,

in this beautiful epigram, as tranſlated from the Greek, by Fawkes:

O ſtranger, ſpare thy life ſo ſhort and frail,
Nor, but when times are ſeaſonable, ſail.
Poor Cleonícus, innocent of guile,
From Syria haſten'd to rich Thaſos' iſle;
The pleiads ſunk as he approach'd the ſhore;
With them he ſunk, to riſe, alas! no more.

THUS, to human action and incident, a counterpart is carried on by means of proper acceſſories or ſcenery.

SECTION VI.

OF CONTRAST.

WITHOUT motion, light, and ſound, all our perceptions of ſight and hearing muſt be at an end: but it is neceſſary, to render light viſible, that there be darkneſs; as it is requiſite, to render ſound audible, that there be ſilence; and that there be reſt, to ſhow that there is motion.

THERE is clearly a relation between time and ſpace; and it has much the ſame effect, whether a great darkneſs be oppoſed to a ſmall light, or a long-continued darkneſs to a light of ſhort duration. Every thing ſeems to ſuffer

an alteration from the changes of time and place; that is, according to the compariſon of ſucceſſive incidents, or by the oppoſition of preſent circumſtances by which qualities are compared.

THE preciſe effect of any object to the eye, depends either on its immediate oppoſition to other objects, or on the more remote relation it bears to ſuch as are retained in memory. This may be further explained by harmony and melody, in muſic; the firſt being an effect produced by the immediate oppoſition of different notes; whereas, in melody, we compare the preſent ſounds with the impreſſion of thoſe that are paſt.

COLOURS are properly oppoſed to colours, and lines to lines; but we muſt not attempt to ſet in oppoſition effects of objects which belong to different ſenſes, neither is it neceſſary that there ſhould always be an immediate contraſt, ſince the mind, retaining former impreſſions, will aſſociate ſuch of them with the preſent, as compoſes the melody moſt grateful to itſelf. We can ſuppoſe no abſolute and ſingle beauty, without ſuppoſing a mind totally diveſted of all other ideas: if memory retain perceptions of other objects, it is impoſſible to preclude compariſon.

COUNTERPOINT, in muſic, is the accompaniment which contraſts the general effect of the melody, as ſhade ſup-

ports light in painting; not reſpecting any part ſingly, but ſuſtaining and heightening each particular melody in the relative effect and proportion it bears to the whole.

UNIFORMITY is the contraſt to variety, and minuteneſs the relative meaſure of magnitude. The inflected ſharpneſſes of viſible objects, ſet off to advantage their protuberant roundings; the former lead to an idea of non-entity, the latter to a notion of plenitude and exiſtence. Roundneſs, ſoftneſs, and ſmoothneſs, are pleaſing, but not by themſelves; it is the rough and the ſharp that give energy to compoſition; a general idea of beauty being conſequent to an aſſemblage of every quality of matter, where

the predominant ſigns of materiality and of gentle feeling are ſtill ſet off by the obſcure foil of their reſpective contraries and privations. An image of light ariſes, as it were, out of darkneſs. Sound ſeems to originate from ſilence, and motion from reſt. Even matter itſelf ſeems to emerge from the void abyſs of ſpace; imagination, in all its conjunctions, like a ſkilful muſician, ſtill proceeding by the rule of contraries.

When any object, however complete in its own nature, enters into compoſition, it then becomes a part of a greater whole, reſpecting which it muſt appear to hold ſomewhat a like relation as its own parts one to another. Thus ſmall oppoſitions, uniting in effect, are form-

ed into wholes, which, in their collective capacity, produce greater and more ſtriking oppoſitions.

SECTION VII.

OF PERSONIFICATION.

BUT though the ſimple and negative images of horror, be immediately borrowed, as it were, from privations, as well as exceſſive excitements of ſenſe, yet, when the mind is highly impaſſioned, it affixes form and animation to thoſe very ideas.—Perſonification is the child of paſſion, which it ſerves again to increaſe.

——A grizly form
Soar'd from the deep on ſhadowy wing diſplay'd,
Doubling the horrors of th' eternal ſhade.

DANTE'S INFERNO, BY BOYD.

THE negative terrors of privation aſſume the form of poſitive deſtruction; and life, clad in the armour of the foe,

is apparently turned againſt itſelf.—Every thing that aſſails the ſenſes violently, is alſo perſonified. In this caſe, *violent motion*, and *loud noiſe*, ſucceed to reſt and ſilence. The proper clothing of rage is fire, its voice the noiſe of thunder, its motion impetuous as that of lightning:

No wretch accurs'd; relentleſs he replies,
Flames as he ſpoke, ſhot flaſhing from his eyes.
POPE'S HOM. IL. B. xxii. v. 433.

Then fierce Achilles, *ſhouting to the ſkies*,
On Troy's whole force with *boundleſs fury flies*.
B. xx. v. 437.

INDEED, wherever the elements are thrown into violent commotion and uproar, the image raiſed in the mind amounts to a kind of perſonification: the

metaphorical terms uſed on ſuch occaſions are always taken from real life; the wind *roars*, the ſea *rages*, the heavens *look angry*, and the thunder appears to *threaten* deſtruction to the univerſe. And theſe ſeem to be the chief materials of what may be called the ſentimental ſublime, amounting only to the animation of thoſe very cauſes which produce the ſublime of the ſenſes. Thus, by the powers of imagination, even death itſelf is animated and perſonified.—Man is an image admiring his own likeneſs: and ſuch is his inclination to admire every thing that has life, that what is wanting in nature he frequently ſupplies from fancy; and when diſpoſed to admiration, he enliv-

ens every thing, that he may ſtill find more occaſion to admire.

PASSION, or ſentiment, being originally the effect of external ſenſe, cannot be conceived to exiſt in abſence of the material images or impreſſions of ſubſtance; ſince we cannot conceive the paſſion of love to be any other than a quality belonging to ſome being or perſon who loves, or is capable of loving. Neither can we ſuppoſe paſſion to be impaſſioned, or affection itſelf to be affected. In order to extend our powers of affection, therefore, we materialize and perſonify the very affections themſelves. It is impoſſible, otherwiſe, to render general ideas of goodneſs diſtinct or engaging.

AND here we may obſerve the force of the firſt images, even in the higheſt moral ſenſe. Every amiable virtue is arrayed in white or the purity and gentleneſs of light. Innocence, Simplicity, Truth herſelf, ſtill retaining what was at firſt grateful to ſenſation; every thing that is good, every thing that is pleaſing, borrowing a metaphor from light, is called fair, bright, or beautiful. VIRTUE is the LIGHT and the LIFE; VICE is the *obſcure* and *horrible* of human action; becauſe that, too, implies the *privation* of life or of happineſs. What is *pain*, but *death poſitive?* what *happineſs*, but *life* and *pleaſing ſenſibility?*

SECTION VIII.

OF CHARACTER AND EXPRESSION.

CHARACTER is that which diſtinguiſhes one object from another. Whatever moſt reſembles the ſymptoms of ſenſibility in ourſelves, we diſcern to have the greateſt ſhare of expreſſion. That particular object is moſt agreeably diſtinguiſhed, which either affects the ſenſes by exciting the livelieſt perceptions; or which, by means of what is delightful to ſenſe, expreſſes the clearеſt ſenſe of internal perception.

EXPRESSION of ſenſe, is the outward characteriſtic of an animal. The ſame power by which the nerves of the human body are internally agitated, affects

their extremities; and gentle ſentiments induce ſimilar changes, which are beſt fitted to expreſs them. The pleaſures of ſenſation are thus again reflected outward, and again are perceived by the ſenſes, communicating a new and ſocial happineſs. It is not till goodneſs be thus expreſſed, that it aſſumes the nature of beauty.

ALL pleaſure, whether proceeding from ſimple or complex cauſes, may be diſtinguiſhed as follows: firſt, the pleaſure of perceiving the qualities of objects by means of ſenſe, by which we know that we exiſt; ſecondly, the ſocial ſatisfaction of perceiving an expreſſion of this pleaſure in others, by which we know that they live or exiſt; thirdly,

the pleaſure of perceiving the ſocial or communicative principle, and that this is mutually perceived in ourſelves, including all the former pleaſures, and to which they are to be conſidered as aſſiſting and ſubſervient.

SOME of our perceptions of pleaſure proceed from powers original and innate; others are derived from experience and cuſtom, ſuch as that which renders things, diſagreeable in themſelves, pleaſing when we are accuſtomed to find them aſſociated with circumſtances and objects that are in themſelves agreeable. Many are the characters already eſtabliſhed by nature; and even artificial characters derive a kind of propriety from cuſtom, which

is rightly termed a ſecond nature. Is it the character of the eye to be lucid, and of the cheek to be red? a bright eye, and a roſy cheek, are, of their kind, the moſt beautiful; each part being beautiful, either according to the degree of gentle expreſſion it poſſeſſes in itſelf, or as it is habitually aſſociated with parts that are more gently expreſſive. Yet, we may obſerve, that this very expreſſion depends, for its effect, on being properly diſpoſed and contraſted, otherwiſe it could not properly be perceived.

ONE conſtituent of beauty, is colour; another, ſhape or proportion: but a variety of gaudy colours would deſtroy the effect of beautiful form. It is ne-

ceſſary, therefore, in order to produce an agreeable effect, that there be a union and ſubordination in the means of expreſſion, and that none of the leſs eſſential qualities confound the greater; as it is requiſite, in order to render any more complex character or compoſition perfect, that there be a principal part, which is moſt ſtriking or expreſſive; the countenance being the moſt remarkable part of the human body, as in the countenance the eye is the principal feature. Even one part of the ſame body owes its beauty to the affinity it bears to the reſt, as the beauty of the whole depends on its oppoſition to other bodies. The neck of a ſtatue, were it ever ſo well ſhaped, would not appear beautiful when ſeparated from the head

and ſhoulders; the ſeeming ſoftneſs and ſmoothneſs of the boſom would ceaſe to pleaſe, did the head and ſhoulders ſeem to be equally ſoft and ſmooth. Complete characters or wholes, to render their qualities perceptible, muſt likewiſe be properly contraſted. And it is as neceſſary that man be diſtinguiſhed from man, as man from other beings: for this cauſe, in the compoſition of a truly beautiful human character, it is required, that there be a certain turn or ſingularity of form and of feature, as well as an air or expreſſion on the whole, to eſtabliſh an identity, difference, and ſuperiority, reſpecting all other characters, to render it peculiarly perceptible and engaging.

SECTION IX.

OF GRACEFULNESS.

In ſpeaking of expreſſion, we muſt diſtinguiſh between an expreſſion of the benevolent kind, and of the iraſcible or malignant. Animals of coarſer nature are fully as ſuſceptible of anger, hatred, revenge, or other of the hoſtile paſſions, as men; and the baſeſt of the human race are ever moſt ſubject to ſuch paſſions; but they know little of pity, love, eſteem, or any of the gentler ones. Their rigid nerves are capable only of the rougher impulſes. The malignant paſſions diſqualify the mind for every pleaſing and ingenious ſenſation. Anger is the painful or ſtupifying paſſion, as love is the delicious and enlivening one.

It would therefore be highly improper to apply the notion of gracefulneſs to one in a fit of rage or jealouſy; what pleaſes moſt in appearance, being evidently an expreſſion of pleaſure.

He who ſeeks to know the origin of gracefulneſs, muſt look for it in his own mind; whatever is graceful there, muſt be ſo in expreſſion. It is a quality analogous to the moſt exquiſite tenderneſs of affection; that ſweet enthuſiaſm of action which goes hand in hand with beauty; or, if we may be allowed the phraſe, it is the *ſoul* of beauty, the *emphaſis* of pleaſing expreſſion.

In the tendereſt and moſt delightful moments of thought, the body is natu-

rally thrown into attitudes which have the power of communicating a like ſoftneſs to the minds of others; it is on account of this pleaſing ſympathy, that we beſtow on ſuch actions or expreſſions the appellation of *graceful.*—Much has been ſaid about an appearance of eaſe peculiar to gracefulneſs; yet perhaps it will be impoſſible to find an example of any very graceful attitude that does not convey ſome degree of carefulneſs or anxiety. The kindeſt concerns of friendſhip, the hopes, fears, and tender ſolicitudes of love, preſent us with images of the utmoſt gracefulneſs. Even in circumſtances that have an appearance of diſtreſs, beauty oft aſſumes an air of the ſublimeſt grace and dignity. There is indeed a certain elevation of

mind, a happy conſciouſneſs of ſuperior virtue requiſite to dignify every paſſion, and is eſſential to grace; for there is no grace without dignity. Grace is the ſublimity of beauty; the modeſt pride of virtue; the gentle dignity of love. An attitude expreſſive of the penſive and pleaſing melancholy, a ſentiment peculiar to the fineſt ſouls, is ever moſt graceful.—The lovelieſt of the Graces has on her face a caſt of ſadneſs mixed with the ſweeteſt joy!—Gracefulneſs is an expreſſion of pleaſure; but pleaſure is not eaſe, it is ſomething more. In truth, the mind is far from being moſt happy when moſt at eaſe, this being at beſt a negative kind of happineſs; in order to be really ſo, it muſt be employed in ſome purſuit

wherein it is deeply concerned, and its affections fondly engaged: beſet on all ſides with danger and fear, we embrace with rapture every occaſion of hope, and often become more intereſted and happy in the purſuit and accompliſhment of our wiſhes, as the labour appears more arduous of overtaking them.

HERE we do not mean to ſay, that graceful action may not be frequently found without its peculiar energy in the mind; we only advance, that our prejudices in favour of gracefulneſs are originally founded on this principle; and would thence infer, that any appearance of beauty which is conſiſtent with perfect indolence or eaſe, can ſuggeſt nothing more than a prediſpoſition to

elegance of action, a ſeeming aptitude in the external ſymptoms of affection. It is not till the paſſions have arrived at maturity, and are ſweetened by the acceſſion of love, that the perſon aſſumes a true air of gracefulneſs. If one who has no elegance of ſoul appear graceful, it is by accident, as a fool ſometimes looks wiſe; or otherwiſe it is affected, and ſo is apt to be accompanied with conſtraint. In love, the ſoul is feelingly alive to every finer ſenſe, and it is the fineſt expreſſion of life which excites it; love perſonified being perfect beauty.

WHEN we meet with a paſſage in any author that expreſſes a lively ſentiment of compaſſion, joy, grief, for even the

ſorrow of ſenſible perſons is often intermingled with pleaſure, there is always preſented to us along with it, an image of gracefulneſs. It is this deliſcious enthuſiaſm which ſo conſpicuouſly diſtinguiſhes the works of *Raphael* and *Correggio*; it is this alone which raiſes above others the writings of the divine *Sappho*. The great charm of poetry is that *ſpirit* or *muſe* which inſpires every thing with elegance and *animation*. The beautiful and the graceful of ſentiment, are expreſſions of the higheſt degree of *life* or *human feeling*.

THE *Venus of Medicis* is generally given as an example of female beauty, and indeed is probably the moſt graceful and perfect of all human productions;

but this ſtatue is highly ſignificant of modeſty, that exquiſite grace and ornament of every amiable virtue. Were an artiſt to attempt a painting of the like kind, how might he ſtill heighten every grace by diffuſing a ſweet bluſh over the countenance of his figure; a circumſtance in which the marble is neceſſarily defective? And this is, no doubt, what is meant by that fine allegory of Venus attired by the Graces, that every thing which is graceful in outward appearance, is only as it were the trappings and ornaments of that heavenly love of the ſoul, by the ancients aſcribed to the *Venus Urania*, in diſtinction to what is attributed to the other *Venus*, worſhipped by them as the terreſtrial and vulgar.

THUS have we briefly traced the progreſs of beauty from its beginning in the ſenſes, to its ſecond ſource of perfection in the mind, both centring in the conſciouſneſs of *life* or *ſenſibility*. And as we have before obſerved, that the means expreſſive of gentle animation, are the very cauſes of pleaſure even to the ſenſes; ſo it is ſtill more worthy of our notice, that nothing gives us ſo much ſatisfaction, as to contemplate the ſymptoms of pleaſure or happineſs in thoſe whoſe merit entitles them to a ſhare either in our love or eſteem.

IT is at this ſecond period pleaſure loſes the name of ſenſual or ſelfiſh. He who poſſeſſes this more extenſive animation, is conſequently intereſted in the

happineſs of his fellow-beings, as likewiſe in the ſtudy of every thing that relates to this finer animation; and, as he perceives beauty in theſe things, he will intereſt himſelf in their perfection, looking on them as in ſome meaſure related to himſelf, and as portions of that univerſal and ſocial whole, of which he conſiders himſelf as a part.

HENCE we may conclude, that the reliſh mankind have for true beauty, is in proportion to the clearneſs of their moral perceptions; or, in other words, to their love of goodneſs; that even inanimate beauty is chiefly but a ſecondary idea, or aſſociation, ariſing from the external ſymptoms of natural affection, which is the beauty of the human

ſoul; and that not only whatever tends to deprive us of mere ſenſitive life, but whatever obſtructs the exerciſe of the finer powers, on which depends the SOCIAL EXISTENCE, provokes *ſorrow*, *fear*, and *horror*; whatever has the contrary effect, promotes HOPE, LOVE, and JOY.

REFLECTIONS

ON THE

HARMONY

OF

SENSIBILITY AND REASON.

INTRODUCTION.

THE pleaſures attending virtue, are, firſt, the immediate ſatisfaction we enjoy in contributing to the happineſs of others, virtue in this caſe being its own beſt reward; not that it beſtows becauſe it receives, but that it receives becauſe it is diſpoſed to beſtow, as a luminous body is yet more enlightened by the reflection of its own ſplendor. Secondly, the pleaſure we receive from the approbation of the world, or rather of that part of it whoſe applauſe we eſteem, proceeding from what is commonly called the love of fame.—Selfiſhneſs is that contracted

ſenſe of pleaſure which excludes every notion of ſocial enjoyment. It is a mere abuſe of words to call that ſelfiſhneſs which includes the happineſs of others; ſince, in the ſtrict idea of a ſelf, there is but one included.

True happineſs flows from the firſt-mentioned principle, and is the enjoyment of pleaſure by reflection, the pleaſure of pleaſing thoſe we particularly love, or the ſtill more extenſive pleaſure of contributing to the happineſs of all mankind. The firſt and ſecond of thoſe motives are indeed aſſiſting to each other; for what can be more pleaſing than ſelf-applauſe when confirmed by the approbation of the good? But thoſe that are actuated merely by the love of fame, are far more numerous than thoſe who firſt conſult the approbation of their own hearts, and who eſteem

the applauſe of the many, not altogether for its own ſake, but as it accords with the voice of reaſon; while he whoſe feelings teach him to diſtinguiſh between the good and the evil of moral action, will alſo have a choice in the rectitude of external applauſe, always preferring the commendation of the few who beſtow it on real merit, to the voice of the vulgar, which is determined by caprice or accident.

But what ſhall we ſay to ſuch as place their ultimate contentment in pleaſures merely ſenſitive, who are ſo devoid of ſympathy, that they enjoy no pleaſure from participation? or to thoſe that are ſo far depraved, as to be deterred from actions hurtful to themſelves and to their fellow-beings, by none but the baſeſt of all motives, the dread

of punishment? Were it possible to persuade mankind, what is their chief interest here to know, that to assist the good endeavours, and to sympathize with the weaknesses and necessities of each other, yields an enjoyment far superior to any that is of a mere selfish nature, there would be little occasion, in a moral view, to threaten the infliction either of temporal or eternal punishment. Indeed it seems almost sufficiently just, if there be any totally destitute of humanity, that such, from their dulness, are deprived of the most elegant and exalted felicity.

Self-satisfaction, it must be confessed, is an object of pursuit in all; but ambition and avarice embrace the shadow for the substance, the means of good for good itself. The ambitious place their chief happiness in fame,

ignorant of what ſhould go before; the avaricious in fortune, equally blind to the bleſſings that ſhould follow. To employ every gentle method, therefore, of extending this principle of human ſympathy; to improve our finer feelings, and give to the ſoul a more tender touch of all that is endearing to humanity, by exerciſing it in the ſpeculation and practice of ingenious virtue, is the great purpoſe of moral precept and of ſound philoſophy.

CONTENTS.

SECT. I. Of Senſibility.

Sect. II. Taſte and Genius.

Sect. III. Poetry, Painting, and Muſic.

Sect. IV. Love and Friendſhip.

Sect. V. Courage and Honour.

Sect. VI. Conſcience.

Sect. VII. Sincerity.

Sect. VIII. Paſſion.

Sect. IX. Temperance.

Sect. X. Wiſdom.

Sect. XI. Power.

Sect. XII. Juſtice and Mercy.

REFLECTIONS ON THE HARMONY OF SENSIBILITY AND REASON.

SECTION I.

OF SENSIBILITY.

THE good qualities of the head and of the heart are rarely found together; their union compoſes a mind truly noble. The folly of ill-directed goodneſs too nearly reſembles vice; the wiſdom of the unfeeling is worſe than folly.

THE ſame principle which prompts a man to ſeek happineſs, or to relieve himſelf in diſtreſs, diſpoſes him to make

others happy, or to alleviate their diſtreſſes. The leſs ſenſibility any man poſſeſſes, his affections are the more ſelfiſh; the more he is ſenſible of happineſs himſelf, he is the more diſpoſed to make others happy.

THAT peeviſh weakneſs and ſoreneſs of nerve, which is apt to be alarmed at trifles, and to be diſpleaſed without ſufficient cauſe, is to be claſſed with other diſtempers; it is falſe or diſeaſed feeling. Some are rather irritable than ſenſible; their coarſer natures are capable only of the malevolent and groſſer paſſions. A prediſpoſition, however, to ſuch paſſions can never proceed from delicacy of ſentiment, but argues a condition the very reverſe. True ſenſibility

is ever inclined to overlook errors, and to forgive injuries; though reaſon, on ſome occaſions, teaches it to act with becoming dignity and ſpirit. The enjoyments or misfortunes of men are to be computed from their different degrees of feeling. What can they mean who ſpeak of the happineſs of the inſenſible? Can there be a greater abſurdity, than to envy the enjoyments of ſuch as want the power to enjoy?

SECTION II.

TASTE AND GENIUS.

An original delicacy of taſte is the inſeparable effect and ſymptom of true ſenſibility; which includes not only a ſenſe of love, pity, gratitude, or common duty, for of thoſe even the rudeſt natures are ſeldom altogether deſtitute; but it is a certain elegance of ſoul, which renders kindneſs moſt kind, and pleaſure moſt pleaſing; it is genius and taſte, the tenderneſs of friendſhip, the politeneſs of eſteem, and the exquiſite and refined endearments of love.

Taste is the younger ſiſter of virtue; the grace of ſentiment; that which pleaſes ſuch as are ſuſceptible of the

higheſt pleaſure; a ſubordinate, yet more amiable quality, which depends on the nicer diſcernments of ſenſibility.

On the clearneſs of moral perception, or ſentimental light, depends the power of chooſing the good and refuſing the evil. Whatever is properly ſaid to improve the mind, increaſes this faculty of accepting and refuſing, by rendering the characters of good and evil more perſpicuous and diſtinct.

All ignorance of beauty, or depravity of taſte, is defective animation; all improvement and perfection of theſe, is increaſed ſenſibility; the powers of the mind, as well as of the body, being rendered more perfect by a proper ex-

erciſe of them. To queſtion whether an improved taſte be an advantage, is in ſome meaſure to doubt whether it is better to be or not to be, to live or not to live. One devoid of taſte, is dead to all the finer feelings.

THERE is acquired as well as natural dulneſs; bad taſte, or evil prejudice, is ſtupidity acquired. To feel, is to be alive; every thing that heightens ſentiment or perception, therefore, increaſes animation.

GENIUS is the power of clearly conceiving, and properly combining, images and ſentiments, either as they relate to what is commonly called utility, or to taſte; it is the higheſt effect of ſenſi-

bility and reaſon, the power of aſſociating ideas harmoniouſly.—Poetry, painting, and muſic, are ſciences peculiarly beholden to genius: poetry is the language of elevated and refined paſſion; painting is ſilent poetry; muſic is the accent of paſſionate expreſſion.

THE term, *genius*, is alſo uſed to denote a particular turn for any ſtudy or employment; but one may have a turn for a ſtudy that requires, properly ſpeaking, little or no genius.

SECTION III.

POETRY, PAINTING, AND MUSIC.

A GOOD poem is an effect of the higheſt effort of human imagination and judgment.

MERE imitation is beneath the dignity of poetry, painting, and muſic. An artiſt ſhould repreſent objects not always as they are; but as they tend to ſoothe ſome pleaſing diſpoſition of the ſoul, or as they are heightened in imagination when it is prediſpoſed to ſentiment and paſſion.

To be inſenſible of the muſical powers, is to be ſo far ignorant of the language of the finer paſſions; but it

is evident, one who never felt the refinements of pity, or of love, cannot conceive how muſic ſhould expreſs them, or diſpoſe to ſuch gentle emotions.

Music is the means of allaying the irrational paſſions, and exciting the virtuous diſpoſitions of the ſoul: ſo far as it anſwers this end, it is to be eſteemed; otherwiſe it is fit only to tickle the ears of ſuch as have no hearts, whoſe preſumption is commonly proportioned to their ignorance and want of feeling.

In all things the pleaſing of ſenſe aſſociates with the pleaſing of ſentiment, and diſpoſes the mind to happineſs and benevolence.

SECTION IV.

LOVE AND FRIENDSHIP.

As two different notes ſounded at the ſame time beget harmony, a quality which belongs to neither of them apart; ſo deſire and eſteem, mutually improving each other, generate love; a paſſion different from either, yet ſuperior to both.

Love, in abſence of reaſon, and hatred, have almoſt the ſame ends and wiſhes. Thoſe only are capable of true friendſhip, who know what is kind and agreeable on every occaſion to do or to ſay, and are ſenſibly pleaſed with what is well ſaid and done. A fool can never enjoy the pleaſures of love: he may

indeed taſte ſomething of the mere animal part; but not the infinite endearments that heighten and protract pleaſure, nor that ſweet mixture of love and eſteem which increaſes with enjoyment.

THEY are miſtaken who ſuppoſe, that the moſt firm friendſhips ſubſiſt between perſons of exactly ſimilar qualities and diſpoſitions; ſuch ſimilarity is more likely to produce jealouſy than friendſhip. There ſhould rather be on the one ſide a little more judgment, and on the other a little more ſenſibility; and the parties ſhould be conſcious of each other's perfections: this obſervation holds peculiarly reſpecting the ſexes.

A DELICACY of perſon and of mind, approaching to weakneſs, is becoming in a female; leſs ſoftneſs, and more ſtrength, are expected in the male: they ought to make up a complete character together, rather than two alike perfect and diſtinct ones; the diſpoſitions of one ſex being qualified by the proper perfections of the other. Nature, by diſtinguiſhing the characters of the ſexes, has removed all rivalſhip between them, which otherwiſe might have been a hinderance to the union of love and friendſhip.

WHATEVER difference marks the delicacy of the female character, renders the perſon of a woman moſt lovely, and this propriety holds alſo reſpecting her

mind; it is that tenderneſs of paſſion, delicacy of taſte, and retired modeſty, naturally peculiar to the ſex, which renders her moſt amiable in the eſteem of a man of feeling.

THE tenderneſs of love and friendſhip affects a narrow circle; the more intenſe the paſſion, it is the more liable to be confined. Univerſal love and particular friendſhip, however, are noways inconſiſtent; different degrees of eſteem are ſuitable to different degrees of merit, and friendſhip is contracted and confirmed by habit and cloſe acquaintance: one may be a well-wiſher to all, but can have a friendſhip only for a few; a perfect love but for one.

An extended principle of benevolence comprehends a friend, a family, a country, and all the world; and, according to the extent of this principle, our capacity for happineſs is extended.

SECTION V.

COURAGE AND HONOUR.

We muſt diſtinguiſh manly courage from brutal ferocity; it is abſurd to ſuppoſe, that courage can exiſt where there is no apprehenſion of danger: the mind that is capable of honour, cannot be inſenſible to fear; the former overcoming the latter, in a noble cauſe, is true bravery.

Rancour and revenge are too frequently taken for ſymptoms of a nice ſenſe of honour, than which no qualities can be more oppoſite to a refined ſenſibility.

Honour relates to thoſe parts of hu-

man conduct not particularly taken notice of by the laws. It teaches a man to preſerve inviolate the ſecrets, and to ſupport the intereſt and reputation, of a friend; to be ſtrictly juſt, where no public law obliges him to juſtice; to fulfill all equitable engagements; to hold moſt ſacred all honeſt truſt repoſed in him. It is a conſcious dignity of ſpirit, which teaches to commit nothing that is mean or diſgraceful; but which excites to generous and noble actions, proceeding from a peculiar delicacy of ſentiment, aſſiſted and tempered by the fortitude of reaſon.

SECTION VI.

CONSCIENCE.

ALL right rules of conduct are drawn from the natural affections, and from experience. The ſame affection which teaches us to love our fellow-beings, reproaches us when we behave ill to them; and this laſt operation of affection is called remorſe, or check of conſcience: but by habit or education, an artificial conſcience may be created, which may ſerve either to aſſiſt or to ſubvert the conſcience of nature:—thus a ſtronger remorſe will follow a crime committed againſt natural affection, when confirmed by civil policy and habit, than could follow from either of theſe motives alone.

NATURE has eſtabliſhed a common and inſtinctive attachment between parent and child, as likewiſe among other relations; but the ſtrongeſt of all affections is that which is conceived by thoſe who love and eſteem each other on account of their ſuperior mental endowments.

A MAN may love his children from the ſame principle that any animal loves its young; but if he alſo perceives that they are virtuous, there reſults from ſuch a conjunction a benevolence not to be expreſſed. This is natural affection, as highly confirmed and approved by reaſon.

THAT an innate ſenſibility leads to the conſciouſneſs of good and evil, is

certain; but it is alſo certain, that this natural ſenſe may be improved by reaſon, or perverted by prejudice; and that the laws of conſcience are frequently derived from cuſtom, which rivets the chains of error. To overcome evil opinions, therefore, the mind muſt get the better of all prejudices or perverſions of conſcience, and eſtabliſh a conſciouſneſs of right on the ſolid foundation of juſt ſentiment and reaſon.

SECTION VII.

SINCERITY.

A LITTLE judgment, with leſs ſenſibility, makes a man cunning; a little more feeling, with even leſs reaſon, would make him ſincere.

SOME have no more knowledge of humanity, than juſt ſerves them to put on an appearance of it, to anſwer their own baſe and ſelfiſh purpoſes.

HE who prefers cunning to ſincerity, is inſenſible to the diſgrace and ſuſpicion which attend craft and deceit, and to the ſocial ſatisfaction which the generous mind finds in honeſty and plain-dealing.

A SINCERE affection is by habit both confirmed and improved; by frequent changes the heart is hardened, and becomes inſenſible to every pleaſing emotion.—Men who know not the pleaſures of ſincerity, and who traffic in deceit, barter an image of kindneſs for a ſhadow of joy, and are deceived more than they deceive.

SECTION VIII.

PASSION.

LET us ſuppoſe an end of paſſion, there muſt be an end of all moral reaſoning. Paſſion alone can correct paſſion. Thus we forego a preſent pleaſure, in hopes that we ſhall afterwards enjoy a greater pleaſure, or of longer duration; or ſuffer a preſent pain, to eſcape a greater: and this is called an act of the judgment. He who gives way to the dictates of preſent paſſion, without conſulting experience, liſtens to a partial evidence, and muſt of courſe determine wrongfully.

SOME, in order to pay a falſe compliment to ſentimental pleaſures, attempt

altogether to depreciate the pleaſures of ſenſe: with as little juſtice, though with like plauſibility, have men endeavoured to decry the natural paſſions and affections, as inconſiſtent with human happineſs. Not from our natural deſires and paſſions do we ſuffer miſery; for without theſe what pleaſure can we be ſuppoſed to enjoy? but from falſe deſires, or diſeaſed appetites, acting without the aid of experience and underſtanding.

He who commits an action which debaſes him in his own mind, beſides its other evil conſequences, lays up a ſtore of miſery, which muſt haunt him as long as the memory of the deed remains.

ALONG with the preſent effects of any action, in order to judge of it aright, we muſt put in the balance its future conſequences, and conſider, on one ſide, the ſatisfaction and honour, on the other, the evil and diſgrace, that may attend it.

MAGNANIMITY exerciſes itſelf in contempt of labours and pains, in order to avoid greater pains, or overtake greater pleaſures.

To an exceſs of paſſion and a defect of judgment, are owing all the errors of men: the former overlooks every object but that which excites it; the latter, loſt in an undiſtinguiſhing or narrow regard, is unable to comprehend the

conſequences of principles and actions. —An exceſſive admiration, ſeduced by mere glare or greatneſs, is blinded to all modeſt light of nature and truth; an unbounded ambition converts the moſt conjectural wiſhes into realities, miſleading the mind from all certain and ſocial joy.

SECTION IX.

TEMPERANCE.

THE great rule of ſenſual pleaſures is, to uſe them ſo as they may not deſtroy themſelves, or be divorced from the pleaſures of ſocial perception; but rather as they are aſſiſted by, and mutually aſſiſting to, the more refined and exalted ſympathy of rational enjoyment.

MEN ever confine the meaning of the word pleaſure to what pleaſes themſelves;—gluttons imagine, that by pleaſure is meant gluttony. The only true epicures are ſuch as enjoy the pleaſures of temperance. Small pleaſures ſeem great to ſuch as know no greater; the

virtuous man is he who has ſenſe enough to prefer the greateſt pleaſure.

SUPERFLUITY and parade among the vulgar-rich, paſs for elegance and greatneſs. To the man of true taſte, temperance is luxury, and ſimplicity grandeur.

WHATEVER pleaſures are immediately derived from the ſenſes, perſons of fine internal feeling enjoy beſides their other pleaſures; while ſuch as place their chief happineſs in the former, can have no true taſte for the delicious ſenſations of the ſoul.

THEY who divide profit and honeſty, miſtake the nature either of the one or

the other. We muſt make a difference between appearances and truths; the really profitable and the good are the ſame.

FALSE appearances of profit are the greateſt enemies to true intereſt. Future ſorrows preſent themſelves in the diſguiſe of preſent pleaſures, and ſhortſighted Folly eagerly embraces the deceit.

EVERY ſpecies of vice originates either from inſenſibility, from want of judgment, or from both. No maxim can be more true, than that all vice is folly. For, either by vice we bring miſery more immediatly on ourſelves, or we involve others in miſery: if any one

bring evil on himſelf, it is ſurely folly; if his preſent pleaſure be to make others miſerable, were he to eſcape every other puniſhment, he muſt ſuffer for it by remorſe, or it is a certain proof he is depr.ved of that ſenſe or ſympathy which is the oppoſite of dulneſs; in either of which caſes, it is evident, that all vice is folly.

SECTION X.

WISDOM.

WISDOM, or Virtue, is nothing more than the diſpoſition to enjoy and to confer the greateſt happineſs, with the knowledge how to attain and to beſtow it.

WISDOM has ever ſome benevolent end in her purpoſes and actions: on the contrary, Folly either miſtakes evil for good; or, when ſhe aſſumes the nature of vice, entertains a malevolent intention.

THE advantages and defects of nature ſhould be conſidered as common to ſociety: the weak have a claim to the aſ-

ſiſtance of the ſtrong, the ſtrong derive a pleaſure from aſſiſting the weak, and the wiſe are ſo far happy as the well-diſpoſed partake of their wiſdom.

THERE is no one virtue that includes not, in a general ſenſe, all the other virtues. Wiſdom cannot ſubſiſt without juſtice, temperance, and fortitude; for wiſdom is the ſum of all theſe. It is impoſſible to be juſt without temperance, or temperate without fortitude; and ſo alternately of the reſt.

SECTION XI.

POWER.

POWER is no good quality by itſelf; it is the power of doing good, alone, that is deſirable to the wiſe. All vice is ſelfiſhneſs, and the meaneſt is that which is moſt contractedly ſelfiſh.

GREAT minds can reconcile ſublimity to good-humour; in weak ones, it is generally coupled with ſeverity and moroſeneſs.—Sublime qualities men admire; they love the gentler virtues. When Wiſdom would engage a heart, ſhe woes it in a ſmile. What the auſtere man adviſes with his tongue, his frown forbids.

AMBITION of wealth and of power ſeems to increaſe in proportion to the inability of enjoying any refined pleaſure.—No man has a natural right to hold a greater ſhare of power than another, except he poſſeſſes a higher degree of merit; if his ſervants are better than himſelf, he ſeems but to uſurp his place. Every one, as far as poſſible, ſhould fill that department for which he is fitted by nature; where he can be happieſt himſelf, and where he can beſt contribute to the happineſs of ſociety.

THE vulgar-rich call the poor the vulgar: let us learn to call things by their proper names; the ignorant and rude are the vulgar, whether, in fortune, they be poor or rich.—The truly poor

and worthleſs are thoſe who have not ſenſe to perceive the ſuperiority of internal merit to all outward accompliſhments.

SECTION XII.

JUSTICE AND MERCY.

IT is not ſo proper to ſay, that virtue leads to happineſs, as to affirm, that whatever leads to real happineſs is virtue. There is no certain way to judge of actions, but by the good or evil that naturally attends them. The reaſon why particular actions are forbidden by law, is, that ſuch actions are found by experience to be attended with evil effects.

BUT, becauſe very few indeed are themſelves capable of taking ſuch an extended view of things as to enable them to judge of all the natural good or evil conſequences of actions, laws

are eſtabliſhed for the direction of the weak, and to reſtrain the vicious from committing actions that, in their effects, are evil.

THE fear of legal puniſhment preſents the only hold that can be taken of thoſe who have no feeling for others; by which they are taught, at leaſt, to feel for themſelves.

LET us be careful to ſeparate the notion of juſtice from that of revenge, which, like other malevolent paſſions, is to be reſtrained by reaſon. The great end of human juſtice, is public or private ſecurity; but forbearance and mercy often reclaim, when violence would be attended with evil conſequences:

for this cauſe, it is ſometimes proper to return good for evil, and to mitigate the rigour of laws with mercy.

WHATEVER ſeverity juſtice may be obliged to inflict, it is ſtill with a view to greater kindneſs.—To reſtore the criminal himſelf to a ſenſe of his duty, to ſet an example to others, or to rid ſociety of a deſperate member, are the three rational ends for which puniſhment or death is inflicted; otherwiſe, retribution of evil is malevolence or blind revenge, and not juſtice.—

THESE principles conſtitute the very baſis of the moral ſcience; but ſavage ignorance worſhips its own pitiable malignity, miſtaking it for perfect

goodneſs, and thence again derives a high authority in favour of the vileſt prejudices and moſt horrible deformities of practice.

THE benign purpoſe of every puniſhment of civil inſtitution, ſhould always be rendered as obvious as poſſible, leſt cruelty be inculcated by example, inſtead of juſtice.—Cruelty may be defined, the act of putting any being to pain without intending by it to prevent a greater evil. Every reaſonable being has ſome end which it purſues in its actions; a good one has ever a beneficent purpoſe.—While juſtice ſlowly lifts the ſword, ſhe ſteadily eyes Benevolence, and receives her aſſent with a tear!

THERE are certain exceptions to general laws wherein juſtice aſſumes the name of mercy; he who in his conduct, obſerves theſe exceptions, is juſtly merciful.

IT is owing to the imperfection of human laws, which cannot provide againſt all accidental circumſtances and exceptions, that an idea of mercy is diſtinguiſhed from that of juſtice; theſe virtues, however, are not really diſtinct;—where mercy is proper, that is, where it is likely to be of better effect than ſeverity, it were unjuſt not to be merciful.

THERE is hardly any ſuch paſſion among the the virtuous as hatred. The vicious hate the enemies of vice; the

good pity the enemies of virtue. A generous mind wiſhes not to find men faultleſs, but is happy in finding occaſions of forgiving their errors.—The violent and hoſtile paſſions are never employed by the wiſe, but for the greater purpoſes of benevolence.

To withhold our power, when we can prevent the ruin of a fellow being, even againſt his will, is to be guilty of his deſtruction. Where is the difference in effect, whether evils are brought on us by our follies, or by fate? Is a man the leſs to be pitied who falls, becauſe his weakneſs was the cauſe of his falling?

Who, if he ſaw a child approaching the brink of a precipice, would with-

hold his aſſiſtance, on a pretence that the child was left to the freedom of its own will? Men are like children, that ſometimes muſt be reſtrained from the ways of error.

WHATEVER may be for the beſt reſpecting univerſal nature, it is the province of man to remove, as far as in his power, all miſeries that aſſail his own nature; partial evil, indeed, among other benefits, furniſhes thus occaſion to him of being virtuous.

THUS it has been inſtanced, through the whole of this performance, that *ſenſibility*, as directed by *reaſon*, conſtitutes VIRTUE.

A SHORT ANALYSIS

OF THE

HUMAN MIND.

INTRODUCTION.

IT is not, perhaps, ſo difficult a taſk for one of free judgment to diſcover true principles of knowledge, as to relieve the minds of men, even in this much enlightened age, from thoſe that are falſe. Seduced on all ſides by evil habits and forced ſyſtems of ſcience, they generally ſeem leſs diſpoſed to regard the genuine dictates of truth, than to reduce nature and reaſon to a monſtrous conformity with their preconceived opinions and extravagant inclinations of paſſion.

This propenſity ariſes chiefly from a fatal inattention to the pernicious effects of falſe

knowledge, and an inſenſibility to the ſuperior advantages which conſtantly attend true learning. The perſpicuity of truth ever tends to aſſiſt the advancement and ſecure the duration of human happineſs; but ignorance is dark, and ſuperſtition gloomy: they are always connected, more or leſs directly, with malevolence and diſtreſs. Theſe obſervations particularly reſpect an imperfect or perverted knowledge of the human underſtanding; hence the nature of evil is confounded with that of good; hence merit or blame are unjuſtly attributed: and in proportion to the bigotted love of error in the ignorant, is ever their violent enmity to thoſe who are in the right.

Of all liberal ſciences, this, indeed, claims a primary regard. What can excite a

ſtronger ſenſe of abſurdity than to perceive men aiming at a proficiency in any abſtract ſcience, before they know in what manner the mind acquires its ideas? How can we believe that thoſe are either properly qualified to improve or inſtruct, who are yet unacquainted with the operations of that intellect which they profeſs to cultivate and inform? There is no ſingle ſcience that does not depend for its perfection on other ſciences; errors in this, inſinuate themſelves into phyſics, theology, and ultimately into morals, vitiating every principle, and producing the worſt of effects.

In the following ſections, therefore, is endeavoured to be given a conciſe and clear view of the preſent ſubject, freed from all affectations of pedantry, and confuſion of

numberleſs diviſions. The erudition of latter ages has been much occupied in multiplying diſtinctions without end, a kind of infatuation, which pretending to explain by intricacy, reſembles the way-faring fire that ſeems to burn brighteſt where it leads the traveller moſt aſtray. The labour of ſucceeding times will probably be employed in removing this maſs of ſuperfluity, and in reſtoring things to their original ſimplicity and plainneſs.

CONTENTS.

SECT. I. Of Affections of Senſe.

Sect. II. Affections of the Mind.

Sect. III. Of Imagination, Memory, and Judgment.

Sect. IV. Of Volition.

Sect. V. Of Abſtract Ideas.

ANALYSIS

OF THE

HUMAN MIND.

SECTION I.

OF AFFECTIONS OF SENSE.

INTELLIGENCE is, originally, that *ſenſe of change* produced in any being, conſequent to an alteration made on it by external matter; a reſult of motions outward and powers internal.—The *capability* of perceiving, we muſt conſider as diſtinct from *actual* perception. The human body does not appear to contain ſenſe in itſelf, but only the power of becoming ſenſible when agitated by fo-

reign objects, as the elective attraction of certain ſubſtances, is excited on the approach of other ſubſtances to which their powers are particularly adapted.

THE body, it is true, is liable to be affected with various appetites and ſenſations, which, in common ſpeech, may properly enough be called internal; but it is more than probable, that even theſe may be ſtrictly ſaid, in another ſenſe, to depend on bodies external. Such appetites and ſenſations are moſt eaſily to be accounted for from the action of fluids, that, in relation to the ſolids and ſentient, are foreign; or from weight or preſſure of certain parts of the body, which thus become, as it were, aliens and extraneous reſpecting one another.

WHEN any of the organs of ſenſe are inflamed to a certain degree, they are rendered more exquiſitely ſenſible; they are alſo more apt to retain and repeat ſuch impreſſions of objects as are made upon them. When any part loſes its faculty of feeling, it previouſly becomes either too rigid or too relaxed. In ſleep, there is a temporary relaxation; in death, a total remiſſion of the nervous ſyſtem.

To render the animal body fit to perceive, it is requiſite that there be a certain fulneſs of fibre, tenſion, or elaſticity, by which motion and ſenſe are propagated. If tenſion be too great, pain is excited by action; if too little, indolence and inſenſibility are induced; the medium is the ſtate of agreeable per-

ceptibility or pleaſure.—It is in thoſe parts of the animal body, alone, which are ſuſceptible of the moſt exquiſite motions and impreſſions of motion, that ſenſe is found chiefly to reſide. The leſs-rarified muſcular parts poſſeſs little or no power of feeling, unleſs the tenſion of their fibres be preternaturally increaſed. The hair, nails, and bones of animals are inſenſible becauſe of their rigidity. For the ſame reaſon, it is probable, that plants are intirely void of ſenſitive quality, their parts being of too rigid a texture to admit of the fine movements coincident to perception.—When we perceive that a particular power is conſtantly attendant on a certain ſtructure or conſtitution of parts, we have ſufficient cauſe to conclude that

this power depends on ſuch ſtructure or conſtitution.

THE ſenſes may all be compriſed in that of feeling, and images differ only as the motions which produce them are reſpectively ſuited to the ſeveral organs, or according to their various modes of inception by thoſe organs, cauſed by ſome difference of ſtructure in the extremities of the nervous fibres; to which alſo we may refer the difference that ſubſiſts among the ſeveral appetites of the body.

HERE, perhaps, it is requiſite to diſtinguiſh between certain perceptions, and objects perceived.—Light is not the thing perceived, but is itſelf a mode

of perception;—it is ſenſe as produced by ſome peculiar motion of matter on the organ of ſight. Neither is ſound any other than a perception; the outward cauſe not being ſound, but only matter in motion. Light and ſound, therefore, are not objects perceived by means of life, but are themſelves modes of living perception: light is life as excited in the eye; ſound is life as produced on the organ of hearing. When minute vibratory motion advances to a certain degree of celerity, it either becomes altogether imperceptible to ſenſe, or it is recognized, not as motion, but the matter itſelf from which it proceeds.

It may be proper enough in common ſpeech, indeed, to ſay we ſee an

object at reſt, but in this caſe it is not the object itſelf that we preſently perceive, but ſome intermediate matter in motion; yet we are ſo accuſtomed to take theſe ſubſtitutes for the things themſelves, that we ſeldom make a difference.—When we obſerve, however, that bodies have the power of reflecting light, or rather the medium which cauſes it, of reverberating air, and reſiſting the touch, we reaſonably aſcribe the property of repulſion, or impenetrability to ſuch bodies; and in this manner it is that we come to diſtinguiſh between living perceptions, and the more ſimple and intrinſic properties of matter.

SECTION II.

AFFECTIONS OF THE MIND.

It is the ſame power which is the cauſe of ſenſation and of ſentiment. If the living power is immediately excited by outward objects, its operations are called feelings of ſenſe; if internally agitated with impreſſions, whether ſimple or aſſociated, they are denominated perceptions of ſentiment, and every ſenſation or impreſſion is either more or leſs pleaſing or painful.

The nervous or ſentient ſyſtem, attracts that which moderately excites it, and repels that which acts on it with violence: hence the origin of affections. The human mind is this power of ſenſe and

affection; its various paſſions diſtinguiſhed by different names, love, hate, hope, fear, and the reſt.

WILL, is no particular principle of the mind, but is the determination of affection: thus the progreſs of deſire may be divided into intention, reſolution, and will. Intention is the ſimple deſire reſpecting the effect, and is partly conditional; reſolution is fixed intention; will is the deſire of exerting the powers for producing the effect: they are only different in degree, being, as it were, the ſeveral ſtages of the mind's action, proceeding from the original emotion of deſire.

ALL paſſions may be reſolved into the ſimple ſyſtem of love and hate; the

various modes of affection being caused only by some apparent accident or circumstance in the exciting object: thus, hope is an anticipation of some enjoyment; fear, a presentiment of something which causes pain or aversion. We fear to be deprived of that which excites pleasure, or that we shall endure that which produces pain. Anger is violent emotion of hatred; jealousy, a mixture of present hate respecting a rival, and fear of losing a promised pleasure; and our hatred increases in proportion to the joy of which we fear to be deprived. Compassion is an extension of that sympathy to others, by which we are prompted to avoid whatever is painful or excites aversion.

IDEAS or ſentiments cannot ſubſiſt but through perceptions of ſenſe; and were the images or traces of every material object worn out, there could remain no affection, ſince in that caſe there would appear nothing either to love or hate.

WERE the organ of ſight deprived of its function, and all images of its objects obliterated, there muſt be an end of all thought hence derived; were that of hearing next diveſted of ſenſe, and its ideas extinct, another chief ſource of life and reflection were wanting. Let us proceed to ſuppoſe the reſt of the ſenſes, with their impreſſions, ceaſing to operate, in ſucceſſion, and we ſhall certainly conclude, that with theſe the

whole of living exiſtence muſt utterly be extinguiſhed.

THE pleaſures of imagination, on account of the infinite harmony of images of which it is capable, is indeed of a ſuperior nature; but in proceſs of time the images or firſt impreſſions wear fainter, and in order to preſerve affection, require to be renewed and refreſhed from their original and clear ſources of the ſenſes. It is by means of ſenſe therefore, that affection is generated, paſſion being inſeparable from perception.

SECTION III.

OF IMAGINATION, MEMORY, AND JUDGMENT.

BUT though all is derived from ſenſe, yet ſenſe and ſentiment are not preciſely the ſame. Influence of light comes from the ſun, but the remaining beams that form, (or at leaſt may be ſuppoſed to form,) the *aurora borealis*, and change into a thouſand beautiful forms in the evening ſky, are different from the direct and ſimple rays of light; and ſo images and impreſſions arranging themſelves in the mind, though ſingly leſs intenſe than their original ſenſations, yield a peculiar pleaſure from the variety of their attractions, and combined effects.

THAT quality of the mind to retain and repeat impreſſions of images, and that operation of it, as the common ſenſory, in which they aſſociate or repel, unite or oppoſe one another, are called memory and imagination.—Simple memory, is the power of retaining impreſſions, whether of ſenſe or imagination. Every clear impulſe communicates a new habit of action to the nervous fibres, to which they are apt to return, either from occurence of ſome internal cauſe, or on the approach of objects that have any connexion with, or bear ſome ſimilitude in their impulſes to thoſe which made the former impreſſion. Dreaming is a faint, broken, or interrupted mode of thinking, in which there is a partial action or repe-

tition of impreſſions, and this is the reaſon that aſſociations of objects formed in ſleep, are, for the moſt part, incoherent and diſorderly.

WHILE the ſentient fibres are at reſt, as always happens in ſound ſleep, there is no thought or perception; when there is an internal movement ſimilar to that which is excited by outward objects, it implies a like change or ſenſe; and every change of inclination or action proper to any ſubſtance, whether denominated material or animal, indicates a correſpondent change in the internal ſtructure of ſuch body or ſubſtance.

THE mind is capable of entertaining only one image or combination of ima-

ges at a time. It may, indeed, by habit be brought to attend to various objects within a ſmall ſpace; to make quick tranſitions from one object to another; but from two ſeparate objects acting at the ſame inſtant, muſt ariſe a ſenſation of a third nature, different from that which would have ariſen from any one of them alone; a ſingle ſentiment, collected from both images united. No ſcene can be contemplated at once by the mind, that cannot when preſent be viewed in one inſtant by the ſenſes. When we are ſaid to view the paſt, it is not to be underſtood, that we can poſſibly perceive things which are not now in being, but only that ideas of them are recognized in a faint or peculiar manner in imagination.

IDEAS of perſonal identity, ariſe from an apparent continuation of paſt and preſent perceptions, connected with an image of our own minds or perſons. We are not conſcious that we are conſcious; ſince in this way we might multiply conſciouſneſs for ever; but the remaining impreſſions of what is paſt, convince us that we, in our perſons, have perceived; and our recent feelings perſuade us, that we ſtill retain *the power* of perception. To ſay, that one can think that he thinks, is to ſay, that he can think twice at the ſame inſtant, which is abſurd. Though the mind may be ſaid, to take a retroſpect, think over again and reflect on its former thoughts, or preſcribe ways of thinking for its future ſelf, the preſent mind is

one, and can admit of no more than one emotion at a time; in ſuch caſes it only repeats its own movements in a manner as paſt, or preſages that things ſhall be ſo and ſo, that is, with proviſion either interpoſed or added, that they are to proceed in ſucceſſion, or in time to come.

THE ſuperiority of man to other animated beings, conſiſts in this, that he comprehends a greater variety of perceptions of ſenſe; that he retains them longer, and eſpecially that he aſſociates and contraſts them in a much more extenſive manner; from which reſults a ſuitable advantage, and ſuperior ſentiment of pleaſure.

JUDGMENT, is perception, as diſtinguiſhing the relative qualities and effects of objects. By a certain ſteadineſs in the powers of perception, images and impreſſions are ſo united or oppoſed, and effects traced to their proper cauſes, as to give every object its juſt conſequence in the ſcale of experience: thus inferences are deduced, and hence proceeds the faculty of right reaſoning and judging.

PROPER ſentiments and actions are the reſult of that delicate, yet durable ſenſibility, which is the ſource of affection, and which by viewing cauſes and effects in their farther relations, is alſo the principle of right reaſon. Thoſe aſſociations and concluſions we have al-

ready formed, operate againſt an exceſſive influence of preſent appetites, and accidental events; and hence the great uſe of right and predetermined principles of action.

SECTION IV.

OF VOLITION.

As the powers of ſimple perception are various in different individuals, ſo an object which excites a certain mode of affection in one perſon, muſt excite a different one in another; and as men are alſo variouſly endowed reſpecting the aſſociating powers, they conſequently are affected with ſentiments as different and various.

The diſpoſition any man poſſeſſes of being acted on in a manner different from other men, conſtitutes his original and proper character. This diſpoſition being excited, he becomes an active agent, whoſe operations are neceſſarily

and exactly determined by the mutual powers of incidental cauſes, and internal diſpoſitions of his nature.

THE human ſyſtem never acts without an impelling cauſe; nature operates as uniformly in it, as in any department of the material world. It is true, that which is called *will* puts the body in motion, but ſomething there muſt be to produce this effort of the will, which is nothing but a determination of the paſſions, liking or diſliking, as theſe themſelves require a prior cauſe of excitement.

WHEN a man firſt reſolves to purſue any object, even in thought, the object is already ſuggeſted, which he only pro-

poſes farther to regard; he is not the cauſe of this reſolution, for this would be to ſuppoſe two minds, the one putting the other in motion, which were abſurd; but ſomething acting on his mind, either as a preſent object or an impreſſion of a former one, he neceſſarily forms this reſolution, no new motive intervening, ſtill to proſecute the ſame. Certain impreſſions preſent themſelves either altogether independent of deſire, or as they are connected with one another in the natural order of aſſociation, and the deſire is an effect of this, and not this of the deſire; but there is in him no other principle to direct this power of aſſociation, for the act of combining images, however cauſed, conſtitutes thought, the concluſion

of which is *will*. The will, therefore, is not independent or ſpontaneous any more than the appetites, incidents, paſſions, and reaſoning powers, of which it is the certain effect.

PERCEPTIONS of objects aſſociate in the mind, and beget new deſires to be gratified again by the contemplation of outward objects; from theſe, and impreſſions of former ones, new arrangements are formed: thus, images and deſires continue to operate alternately, and to be the certain cauſes of will and of action. It is either the immediate effect of objects on the ſenſes, the remaining and aſſociated impreſſions of them, or a mixture of both, which pro-

duces desire, and desire produces what is called corporeal motion.

To suppose that will alone is free, is to suppose it independent of all former causes, and separated from sense, affection, and judgment; or to suppose these of no authority, and that will is a first cause, self-acting, and not influenced either by outward causes or powers internal.—When we say that any one is free, therefore, we seem only to assert that his present inclinations belong to himself; not that, considering all things, he can possibly be disposed otherwise than he is, but that his dispositions proceed from an internal principle, which is not *immediately* dependent on other powers or events.

PERCEPTIONS, when ſeparated from their proper cauſes, and converted into laſting impreſſions, the mind claims as its own; and whatever reſolutions are formed from ſuch impreſſions, it eſteems as proceeding from itſelf. The actions, likewiſe, which originate in emotions derived from intellectual compoſition, are in ſome ſenſe to be aſcribed to the mind's identity; outward objects no longer acting independent of the mind's power, but this power becoming the principal and preſent cauſe of will and action.

IF we extend our regard to remoter cauſes of organization and temperament; and to thoſe foreign motives, whether phyſical or moral, which ope-

rate continual changes, and whence arise the passions which constitute will,—all is again resolved into absolute and irresistible necessity.

SECTION V.

OF ABSTRACT IDEAS.

WHAT is commonly called ideal abſtraction, appears to be but a kind of tranſpoſition or ſubtilization. It ſeems impoſſible, even in idea, to ſeparate qualities of extenſion, form, and motion, altogether from matter. The mind can, indeed, conceive general ideas of bodies variouſly extended, formed, and moved; but theſe are not abſolute abſtractions of quality, but collective ideas, which cannot ſubſiſt without images of body, however indiſtinctly conceived, or tranſiently paſſing in imagination.

AND, admitting the mind to poſſeſs a power of perfect ideal abſtraction; to

affirm that qualities can exiſt alone, is ſtill taking for granted the ſubject in queſtion.—An impreſſion of motion in the mind, is not an abſtraction from any real object, but only one mode of motion ſubſtituted for another. An idea is a motion of the mind; and the queſtion ſtill recurs, can there exiſt any motion of thought abſtracted from matter?—If we never perceive motion to exiſt alone, and independent of body; if we never experience life to ſubſiſt in abſence of animal ſubſtance; by what juſt method of reaſoning, what fair analogy, can we conclude that ſuch properties do ever really and ſeparately exiſt? We muſt, therefore, regard this power of abſtracting, as a property that has no being but in motions of the hu-

man mind; a property as unalienable from animal ſubſtance, as other qualities are inſeparable from the leſs delicate and orderly modifications of matter. Some forms of matter, it is true, do not appear to perceive, nor others to move or vegetate; but who knows all the powers of ſubtile and organized matter? who is acquainted with all the *active relations* of bodies; the different *ſpecies of motion?* Becauſe men cannot well conceive how certain effects are produced, this is no good reaſon we ſhould accept of any cauſe they are pleaſed to aſſign for them. A philoſophical diffidence would rather ſuggeſt we ſhould ſuſpend our opinions, than turn a whimſical ſurmiſe into a poſitive aſſertion.

FROM the various changes of objects, as they relate to one another, and to human ſenſe, the mind conceives particular ideas; and from a combination of particulars, viewed as it were at once, or in ſucceſſion, again forms what are called abſtract or general ones.—

IN the apparent variation of bodies, reſpecting poſition, originates a general idea of motion; a movement of the mind importing a gradual change of objects, in relation of place. From a connection of images, appearing ſucceſſively, is deduced the notion of time, and as objects ſeem to recede in remembrance, one after another, imagination, in a collective image of ſucceſſion, which is denominated time, and is alto-

gether an ideal being, conceives them as retiring or paſſing away.

IDEAS of privation are formed as other abſtract ideas. In attempting to affix a meaning to the word *nothing*, the mind endeavours to diveſt itſelf of all preſent impreſſions of objects, and to approach as near as poſſible an inſenſate ſtate; hence deriving an idea, as it were of darkneſs viſible, it denominates ſuch an idea of nothing.—All ideas, indeed, are a kind of ſenſations; an idea of nothing is a ſenſation which repreſents the abſence of all other ſenſations. In this manner it is, that ideas of empty ſpace, infinity, darkneſs, ſleep, and death, are conceived. From theſe examples it is eaſy to diſcern how other ideas are

conceived, whether of positive or negative nature.

When we speak of moral goodness, we mean the goodness of man; the general attribute of the general substance. Thus when we say *the good*, or *the beautiful*, we signify universal goodness or beauty. The quality, therefore, as quality, is never separated from the substance, but from many different individuals, a common image is collected, and the peculiar quality is in like manner generalized. Abstractions, particularly of the human virtues, it is remarkable, easily change into complete personifications; and the mind never more nearly arrives at an image of person, than when it attempts a moral abstrac-

tion. From an inclination of the mind to ſubſtantiate and perſonify, thus qualities and relations are converted into ideal ſubſtances and perſons, which are fondly taken for diſtinct eſſences, or real abſtractions. Of theſe, alone, however, we can form no clear conception, unleſs we ſuppoſe them turned into ſubſtance or perſon, and then they are no longer mere ideas of quality.

THAT there are ſubſtances too etherial immediately to be perceived by human ſenſe, is readily admitted; but it does not follow that motions or ideas are ſubſtantial. As well may we affirm that modes and relations of qualities, too, are ſo many ſeveral ſubſtances. When we ſpeak of thought, we mean

a certain action excited in an intelligent being. The mind, ſtrictly ſpeaking, is that which is moved, not the motion; it is the percipient, not the perception. —There is a certain ground which mortals cannot approach, ſave alone in glimmering thought, and yet which the wiſe never attempt, but with the utmoſt reſerve, and ſilent veneration; —it is that which borders on an intellectual image of the UNIVERSAL SPIRIT; the great MIND OF THE WORLD: —yet what ſafe idea can the chaſteſt imagination here form, other than of pureſt ſubſtance, whoſe act is cauſe and living operation? Who, in the motions of a ſubtile fluid, ſuited to the viſual organ, illuminates the world, and who even ſubſtantially exiſts in the

minds of the wiſe? In a word, who lives in the perfect action of ſubſtance; the purity of nature?—How can we conceive of that which ſurpaſſes ſenſe, but by means of what we know? How proceed to juſt inference, but by ſome clear rule of analogy?

THE candid reaſoner will carefully diſcern between ideal and ſenſible ſeparations and images.—However pleaſing and innocent it may be for the mind to indulge the exerciſe of its tranſpoſing and creative powers, knowing the images ſo changed or created to be fanciful, it is mere madneſs to confound things imaginary and real; and ſuch miſtakes are attended with the moſt fatal effects. Of body moving, it is eaſy

to conceive; of animal matter excited into ſenſe, it is yet poſſible to form ſome conception;—but of motion moving, thought thinking, energy energizing, or pure intelligence intelligencing, what man knows any thing? what man in his ſober ſenſes pretends to know? —"Ideas proceed from material beings, therefore material beings proceed from ideas." "The word proceeds from man, therefore man proceeds from the word!" —Were it not for the pitiable conſequences, how far remote from the notice of a rational nature? how far beneath the contempt of ſcience?—Such, however, are the ravings of poetical fiction confounded with the facts of philoſophy; ſuch the ſources of diſtractions that have drenched the world with

blood; affording horrid proof; how nearly error is related to wickedneſs! When men are ſo loſt to every feeling of temperance as to miſtake the wanderings of paſſion for the workings of reaſon; all merit is aſcribed to themſelves, all blame imputed to ſuch as recede from their opinions. It is affirmed that the incredulous muſt be immoral; and to prove this paradox, recourſe is again had to the baſeſt arts of traduction. The moſt ridiculous falſehoods are to be believed, merely becauſe they are ſurpriſing! Things impoſſible credited, for this very cauſe, that they are impoſſibilities! It is *our* duty only humbly to admire! Hence intolerant pride ſculks in an abject diſguiſe of lowlineſs; hence men become worſhippers of their

own moſt extravagant follies and vices; the ignorant loudly ſound the praiſes of ignorance; the vicious glorify depravity: and in proportion to the progreſs of oſtentatious error, is the rancour and cruelty conceived and exerciſed againſt the wiſe and the good.—Mortals never hate, torture, maſſacre one another, in ſupport of propoſitions that are demonſtrable; it is myſtery and impoſture that engender moſt moral evils in the world.

FROM ſcenes of ſublime darkneſs and magnificent miſery, let us turn to the mild radiance that illuminates the calm regions of truth. Let us ſtudy to eſtabliſh principles of wholeſome taſte, ſocial reſpect, and every uſeful ſcience, on

a fair foundation of nature and experience. Let us deduce from real conſequences of actions, ſure maxims of virtue; and before we praiſe or detract, learn to diſtinguiſh what is deſerving of eſteem or condemnation.—The intelligent, alone, are qualified to beſtow juſt contributions of praiſe;—the approbation of ignorance is the worſt of cenſure.

THE END.